Akers v. Mortensen Appellant\u27s Reply Brief Dckt. 39182 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
11-5-2012
Akers v. Mortensen Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt.
39182
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Akers v. Mortensen Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 39182" (2012). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 4027.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/4027
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
DENNIS LYLE AKERS and SHERRIE L. AKERS, ) 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Respondents, 
v. 
VERNON J. and MARTI MORTENSEN, 
Defendants/Appellants, 
and 
D.L. WHITE CONSTRUCTION, INC., DAVID L. 
WHITE and MICHELLE V. WHITE, 
Defendants/Appellants. 
) Supreme Court Docket 
) No.: 39182 
) 
) Related Supreme Court Case 
) Docket No.: 39293; 39493 
) 




APPELLANT MARTI MORTENSEN'S REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District for Kootenai 
County. Honorable John T. Mitchell, District Judge, presiding. 
Susan Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d' Alene ID 83814 
208.664.1684 fax 
Attorney for Respondents 
1 
Dustin Deissner 
Deissner Law Office 
1707 W. Broadway Ave. 





Attorney for Marti Mortensen 
Table of Contents. 
Table of Cases and Authorities ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. iii 
Statement of the Case ............................................. -1-
Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. -4-
1. Matters Incorporated by Reference ........................... -4-
2. Punitive Damages. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. -4-
3. Attorneys Fees .......................................... -18-
4. Punitive Damages Allocable to MARTI MORTENSEN ......... -19-
A. This Issue was Within the Scope of Remand ........ -20-
B. New Events ................................. -20-
5. Change of Judge ......................................... -21-
Conclusion ..................................................... -21-
11 
Table of Cases and Authorities 
Akers v. Mortensen, 147 Idaho 39, 205 P.3d 1175 (2009) ........... -20-, -21-
Bumgarner v. Bumgarner, 124 Idaho 629,862 P.2d 321 (1993) .......... -19-
Cheney v. Palos Verdes Inv. Corp., 104 Idaho 897, 905, 665 P.2d 661,669 (1983) 
-5- -17- -19-. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , , 
Cox v. Stolworthy, 94 Idaho 683, 496 P.2d 682 (1972) .................. -17-
IRC6-202 ..................................................... -18-
Linscott v. Rainier National Life Insurance Co., 100 Idaho 854, 
606 P.2d 958 (1980) .............................................. -5-
Manning v. Twin Falls Clinic & Hospital, Inc. 122 Idaho 47,830 P.2d 1185 
(1991) ......................................................... -19-
Mountainview Landowners Co-op. Ass'n, Inc. v. Cool, 142 Idaho 861, 136 P.3d 
332 (2006) ..................................................... -20-
State v. Hosey, 134 Idaho 883, 886, 11 P.3d 1101, 1104 (2000) 886, 11 P.3d 11 
............................................................... -20-
111 
Statement of the Case 
Marti Mortensen adopts and incorporates by reference Whites' appeal brief, 
which includes the following: 
This case is an easement dispute. The basic layout of the properties involved 
in the case is seen in Trial Exhibit 6, a survey map produced In July, 2002. 
Mortensen acquired his property in 1994 from Peplinski (Trial Exhibit D-20) and 
previously owned by Millsaps. White's properly was acquired from Mortensen In 
2001 and 2002 (Trial Exhibits D-21 and 0-22), part of the 160 acres that 
Mortensen obtained from Peplinksi. 
The access road has been in the same location on Akers' property since as 
early as 1958. (Trial Exhibits 3 and J-1), seen clearly in 1965 aerial photographs. 
(Trial Exhibit K-I) Akers in 1982 altered the approach to the Access Road as it 
left the County road (Tr., Vol. I, p. 662, II 34), altering the travel portion of the 
easement that was being used by Peplinski. (Tr., Vol. I, pp. 661-62, II. 
18-25,11.1-5). After Akers put in the curved approach Peplinski rebuilt the portion 
of the Access Road that tied into the new curved approach over the course of two 
or three days using fill material that he cut from the embankment on the south side 
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of the Access Road and adjusted the position of the Access Road in Section 24 so 
that it curved slightly south onto his property. (Tr., Vol. I, pp. 812-13, II. 13-25, 
1-20) Peplinski continued to use the curved path approach of the Access Road to 
access his property until It was sold to Mortensen in 1994, as did Mortensen 
without opposition from Akers. (Tr., Vol. 1, pp. 251-52, II. 19-25 1-7). After 
Mortensen sold the property to White, Akers began blocking Appellants access to 
their respective properties and filed this suit. 
On May 8, 2002, the district court entered a temporary restraining order, 
restraining Akers from blocking access to Appellants' property, but also prohibited 
Appellants' use of the curved approach to reach the Access Road. (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 
78). This order precipitated construction of the 12.2 foot approach but that was 
not the original route traveled to use the Access Road.(Tr., Vol. I, p. 330, II. 
147-19). In light of the district court's order, Mortensen and White began making 
Improvements to the area south of the curved approach, (Tr., Vol. 1, pp. 264-65, 
II. 10-25,1-21) so that Appellants could get to the Access Road from the County 
Road. (Trial Exhibit 769) The trial exhibits establish the Access Road's route as it 
left Government Lot 2 and crossed into Section 24. Trial Exhibits D42, D43 and 
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D-44, depicted the access road as It left the County Road, and made a wide curve 
into Section 19 before it turned Into Appellants' property. (Trial Exhibits D-42, 
D-43, and D44, E). 
In January 2002, White began excavating on his property, changing grade to 
create a new access point. (Tr., Vol 1, p. 937-38, U. 3-25,1-2; Trial Exhibit 6) It is 
in this location that Judge Mitchell decided the Access Road crossed into Whites' 
property via a prescriptive easement. 
On 1 st remand Judge Mitchell ruled that the access road crossed into 
SECTION 24 into Akers land but immediately turned 90 degrees leaving 
Mortensens and Whites with a nonfunctional easement. On the 2nd appeal 
Mortensens and Whites were granted a new trial and jUdge. However that opinion 
was retracted and replaced with a substitute opinion months later. In the substitute 
opinion this Court determined that the prescriptive easement for the entire 
roadway was only 12.2. However the photographic and testimonial evidence is 
dubious. (White brief p. 21-22) The trial court declined to permit new evidence 
that would have shown the exact width and location of the easement with great 
specificity. (White brief p. 23) 
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Argument 
Note - Appellant refers to some documents that will be the subject of a 
motion to Augment the Record with some older documents not included in the 
original Transcript for this appeal. 
1. Matters Incorporated by Reference 
Respondents argue theat Marti Mortensen makes no argument about 
location of the easement, because we incorporated Vernon Mortensen's argument, 
and his argument was too poorly briefed to be considered. That issue is, we 
understand, as yet not fully resolved. 
First, we incorporated the arguments of Vernon Mortensen and White 
Construction. Second, Vernon Mortensen's arguments, while perhaps not artfully 
couched, are nonetheless cogent and are set out below. 
2. Punitive Damages 
Judge Mitchell's damages against Mortensens and Whites today, now that 
they have an easement, remain the same as 8 years ago when the court ruled 
Mortensens and Whites were land-locked. The court's reasoning was that since 
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Mortensens and Whites knew they had no easement but still used the access road 
their trespass was wanton, Malicious and with trickery. His award, totaling 
$346,542.00 was based on his erroneous determination that the access road never 
crossed into section 24. Instead it turned south entered Reynolds' property and 
climbed a cliff before entering the 160. Almost half of the entire sum of damages 
against Mortensens and Whites are punitive damages against Mortensens. Judge 
Mitchell based all damages on three premises; that Mortensen was involved in 
other easement litigations, not supported by the record; that the access road was 
only 12.2 feet wide based on a survey in 2002 not of a road but of a travel path of 
a road and that Dennis Akers granted Mortensens permission to use the road when 
Vernon Mortensen supposedly met with Dennis Akers the day before Mortensens 
purchased the Peplinski 160 acres, also unsupported. 
The primary purpose for punitive damages is deterrence of similar conduct. 
Linscott v. Rainier National Life Insurance Co., 100 Idaho 854, 606 P.2d 958 
(1980). We all agree that punitive damages may be awarded where there is "an 
extreme deviation from reasonable standards of conduct, and that the act was 
performed by the defendant with an understanding of or disregard for its likely 
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consequences." Cheney v. Palos Verdes Inv. Corp., 104 Idaho 897, 905, 665 P.2d 
661,669 (1983). The issue focuses, however, on whether Mortensen's state of 
mind was "extremely harmful." R. T. Nahas v. Hulet, 114 Idaho 23, 752 P.2d 625 
(et. App. 1988). Where, as in that case, the scope of the easement is lawfully 
undefined, the extreme harmfulness cannot be readily established. 
A. Mortensen's Recidivism 
Judge Mitchell found "This is not the first time Mortensen has bought 
property low, sold quickly for a marked increase, then found himself in litigation 
because of lack of access to that property". (Tr. P. 570 at 596). In fact Judge 
Mitchell states this is the "primary reason the punitive damage awards are in 
different amounts as between Mortensens and Whites." [Tr. P. 570 at 589] But 
Appellant believes there is no evidence in the record to show such prior "other 
litigation." It is impossible to prove a negative, but Appellants have consistently 
asked the trial court to articulate what previous litigation is referenced, and 
Appellants believe there are no such. 
Judge Mitchell stated: 
This is not the first time Mortensen has bought property low, sold quickly 
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for a marked increase, then found himself in litigation because of lack of 
access to that property". (Tr. P. 570, at 596) 
Judge Mitchell has reaffirmed this decision throughout the life of this ten year 
litigation whereupon he assessed huge punitive damages against Mortensens: 
This Court has assessed Mortensen differently as a recidivist due to his 
conduct in other situations and other litigations. All of which result in 
differing amounts of punitive damage awards. [Tr. P. 570 at 593] 
There is certainly proof that Mortensens were very consistent in their 
intimidation in this case and in other cases prior to and during this litigation. 
That is the primary reason the punitive damage awards are in different 
amounts as between Mortensens and Whites." [Id. Page 589, starting at line 
37] 
And, at least as to Mortensens, that "repetitive antisocial conduct" has 
occurred in other litigation ..... [Id. P. 590, starting at line 26] 
Campbell states" ... that a recidivist may be punished more severely than a 
first offender [because] repeated misconduct is more reprehensible than an 
individual instance of malfeasance ... " [Id. page 592, starting at line 44 ] 
Thus, this is not Vernon Mortensen's first time to enter the litigation 
rodeo ....... " [Id. At 600, starting atline 39] 
For Vernon Mortensen to now argue: "I am demanding Susan Weeks 
provide the case numbers [of this prior litigation]" entirely misses the point. 
It is not plaintiffs' burden to now prove the truth of what Vernon Mortensen 
failed to rebut at trial." [Id. Page 602, lines 3-5] 
However, no one testified to Mortensens' prior access litigations and exhibits were 
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never entered into evidence. Mortensen couldn't rebut non- existing testimony or 
exhibits. That finding is unsupported. 
Judge Mitchell also repetitively found Mortensens "harmed innocent 
purchasers" but does not name a single "harmed innocent purchaser" nor can the 
name of one be found in the trial record; not a single harmed innocent purchaser 
testify in court. There are no harmed purchasers. The trial court has no substantial 
and competent evidence to support that claim. 
One who is unfamiliar with this case could read the many misrepresented 
facts and believe the trial was about Mortensens selling land to Akers and then not 
providing access and thus harming them while in truth Akers sued Mortensens and 
White in an effort to take away their legal access which they did until this case 
was appealed to the Supreme Court. 
B. Prescriptive Easement 
Judge Mitchell made a finding that Mr. Mortensen left a card with Akers 
indicating he was going to buy the Peplinski property. [Findings ~4 p. 20] 
However Mr. Akers testified that he did not know Mortensen had bought the 
Peplinski property until 6 months later. [Trial Transcript p. 991 lines 13-22, 993 
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lines 18-25] Judge Mitchell's finding that Mr. Mortensen's use of the easement 
was occasional was contradicted by Mr. Akers's testimony. [Trial Transcript p. 
627 lines 10-25] 
Judge Mitchell has based his findings on a single false premise that when 
Mortensens bought 160 acres from Peplinski there was no legal access. That is 
what Judge Mitchell initially wrongfully determined eight years ago. However 
with the aid of the Supreme Court it has been determined that there never was an 
access problem. Judge Mitchell continues to base huge punitive damages against 
Mortensens as if his initial and erroneous opinion of lack of easement was correct. 
Judge Mitchell found "credible the testimony of Dennis Akers that Mr. 
Mortensen left a card in Akers' door wanting Akers to call, that Mortensen was 
going to buy the land from Peplinskis the next day, that Akers then gave 
Mortensen permission." (FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
ORDER, Filed 1-2-03, paragraph # 4, page 20) But Dennis Akers' own testimony 
establishes that six months after Mortensens purchased in September 1994 he still 
didn't know Mortensens had purchased the 160 acres. 









before this matter is resolved you know that the Peplinskis 
have already sold the property? 
I didn't know that. I was told. I hadn't been shown nothing. 
If you didn't know why did you answer in the affirmative? 
They told me that they'd sold it, but I hadn't seen nothing. 
Okay. Did you have any reason to dispute that the property had 
been sold from the Peplinskis to Mr. Mortensen? 
Didn't know. 
You didn't know who bought the property? 
No. They never said nobody's name or anything. All they said 
was that it could've been sold. 
(Trial Transcript, page 991, lines 13-22) 




purchased the property at the time your deposition is taken on 
March 6, 1995? 
Does it have his name in here somewhere? 
'Yes" or "no", Mr. Akers. 
I don't know because at my deposition I never was told 
anybody's name or anything that I can remember. 
(Trial Transcript, page 993, lines 18-25) 
Judge Mitchell made a critical mistake when concluding Dennis Akers gave 
Mortensens permission to use the east curved portion of the road or any part of the 
road the day before Mortensens purchased the Peplinski property. Mortensens 
used the access road for seven years after purchasing from Peplinski and prior to 
Akers filing suit and falsely alleging Mortensens could only access their property 
with Akers permission now withdrawn. During those seven years Mortensens had 
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established a prescriptive easement on the east curved portion of the road. Judge 
Mitchell extinguished Mortensens' claim of a prescriptive easement on the east 
curved portion of the road based on Akers' permission to use that part of the road 
the day before Mortensens purchased the 160 acres from Peplinskis. 
That Mortensens used the road frequently and openly for seven years is 
supported by V.J. Mortensens and Dennis Akers' testimony. However Judge 
Mitchell ruled that Mortensens' use of the road was infrequent. 
Reagan: Besides logging what other uses did Mr. Mortensen make of 
the road during his ownership of the property? 
Akers: Urn, I have no idea. He ran a backhoe up there day and night 
constantly making changes doing something. I don't know what 
he did. It was none of my business so-
(Trial Transcript page 627, lines 19-25) 
Judge Mitchell: Mr. Mortensen testified he never asked Akers for 
permission to use any part of the road since he purchased in 1994, that he 
never tried to hide his travel from plaintiffs, although the frequency of his 
travel was rare. 
(FINDINGS OF FACT CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER, Filed 
1-2-03, paragraph # 4, page 20) 
Judge Mitchell's many critical errors have been consistent throughout this 
litigation. Had the interpretation of evidence been correct, the facts would have 
been entirely different as would have been the conclusions. 
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C. Width of Easement 
Judge Mitchell found the easement was only 12.2 feet wide, yet the 
testimonies of William A. Millsaps, (Tr., Vol. I, p.874,I1. 5-14) Richard Peplinski 
(Tr., Vol.!, p. 7 7 6, Ll. 22-25, p. 77 7, n. 1 - I 6) and even Dennis Akers (Tr., Vol. 
I, p. 984,11. 8-18) all concur that the original road was 25 feet wide or wider. 
The 12.2 foot wide easement is the only basis that supports punitive damages for 
trespass. 
Judge Mitchell ignored the competent and substantial evidence of four 
witnesses when determining that the access road was 12.2 feet wide. Not a single 
witness testified to that width. Four witnesses testified the access road was 25 
feet wide or wider. Those witnesses included Richard Peplinski, W.L. Millsaps in 
the form of an affidavit, William A. Millsap, the son ofW.L. Millsaps and even 
Dennis Akers. The only other witness to testify about the access road prior to 
Akers' arrival was William Reynolds who didn't give an opinion regarding the 
width. Instead he described the access as a two tire track trail but never mentioned 
the amount of flat ground on each side of each track. 
The 12.2 width of the road was determined by a survey by Scott Razor made 
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in 2002 well outside the critical time between 1966 and 1980 and showed a travel 
path with flat ground on each side of that travel path. 
W.L. MILLSAPS: That roadway at said date served as ingress and 
egress for farming equipment which consisted of 
trucks and various types of field equipment such 
as combines which have a width of twenty feet or 
more. We contemplated that the width, although 
expressed in the reservation of easement, was to 
be at least thirty feet, so as to be able to handle the 
equipment and also to allow for proper preparation 
of the road surface and proper drainage with 
respect thereto. This was under- stood by the 
Grantees, Mr. and Mrs. Baker." 
(See affidavit ofW.L. Millsaps.) 
Judge Mitchell found that only one Millsaps testified and that he contradicted his 
own testimony with his affidavit, but W.L. Millsaps who was deceased at the time 
of trial testified by Affidavit while his son William A. Millsaps who was living at 
the time of trial testified in person. 
Judge Mitchell: Defendants now argue the easement by prescription 
should be 25 feet wide. (Defendants') Brief on Remand, 
pp. 5-9. Defendants argue W. L. Millsap's testimony and 
Richard Peplinski's testimony at trial supports this 
conclusion. Id., pp,6-7. However, both Millsap and 
Peplinski were not as credible as William Reynolds. 
Millsap's trial testimony was contradicted by his 
affidavit, as noted by this Court in its 2003 findings of 
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fact. 
(See page 11, lines 4-8 of the trial court's Order on Remand filed 9-7-06) 
The testimonies of William A. Millsaps, Richard Peplinski and even Dennis 
Akers all concur with W.L. Millsaps affidavit that the road was 25 wide or wider. 
William A. Millsaps testified as follows: 
Q: I'm gonna show you Defendants' Exhibit 44, and, I'm gonna tell you that 
this is a blow-up of an aerial map back from 1972. I'm gonna show you 
Millsap Loop Road coming up, curving around. That would be the rest of 
the loop, right? 
A: Yeah. 
Q; And then the access road into your property? 
A: Yeah, that's it right there. 
Q: Okay, does Defendants' Exhibit 44 accurately depict the road as it was in 
say, summer of 1966? 
A: Looks like it to me, yes. 
Q: Okay. Does the width of the road depicted in that exhibit, that aerial 
photograph look like about the width of the county road? 
A: Looks like it to me. 
Q: Is that your recollection of how the road was in 1966? 
A: Yes it is. 
Q: Okay, do you have any estimate for how wide the road surface was --
let's just 
say except this bog area that you maybe went around, about how wide was 
the rest of the road that you used up until 1966? 
A: Oh, I'd say twenty to thirty feet twenty-five feet, something like that 
Q: It wasn't just two tracks? 
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A: No, 
Q: Was it ever just two tracks in the dirt? 
A: Not that I remember. 
(Tr., Vol. I, p.874 ,11. 5-14) 
Richard Peplinski confirmed Millsaps' testimony as follows: 
Q: How wide was some of the equipment that you used this road for? 
A: We had equipment as wide as 25 feet. 
Q: Could you describe for us - - well, here, let me ask you this. Let's look 
again at 
D-44. 1 realize that that blowup's a little bit fuzzy, but does that accurately 
depict the relative width of your access road compared to what is depicted 
in that photograph of Millsap Loop Road? 
A: Looking at the picture and doing a comparison, yes. 
Q: Is it fair to say that your private access road was nearly as wide as the 
county road coming up to it? 
A: Yes. 
Q: When your dad purchased the property in 1967, was that road just two 
tacks? 
A: No. 
(Tr., Vol. 1, p. 776, Ll. 22-25, p. 77 7, 11. 1 - I 6) 
Dennis Akers also testified the road width should be 25 feet: 
Q: Basically under that agreement with the Peplinskis in terms of what -
-was the road to be changed or stay the same as it was? 
A: Well, that's basically what it was. It was to stay like it was which is 25 
feet basically. That includes the ditches and edges. 
Q: The ditches and the shoulder, the contour of the road? 
A: Right, um-hmm. 
Q: All of that 25 feet? 
A: Right. 
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(Tr., Vol. I, p. 984,11. 8-18) 
A 12.2' easement has to be found in order to impose damages and punitive 
damages against defendants, since the conduct giving rise to punitives is trespass 
outside the bounds of the easement. 
Judge Mitchell: Defendants argue at length that trespass damages, emotional 
distress damages and punitive damages are not appropriate. 
(Defendants') Brief on Remand, pp.9-41. Defendants' argument 
is premised on their claim they have done nothing wrong if 
they have a 25 foot wide easement by prior use or by 
prescription. As stated above, this Court finds no easement by 
necessity and the prescriptive easement is limited to 12.2 feet. 
The Idaho Supreme Court wrote: "The question of whether and 
to what degree the Defendants' conduct constituted trespass on 
the Akers' property is intertwined with the scope and 
boundaries of the Appellants' easement." 127 P.3d at 207. This 
Court finds most of defendants' actions of trespass involved 
activity outside the boundaries of this 12.2 foot easement. 
(Page 13, lines 12-20, ORDER ON REMAN filed 9-7-06) 
12.2 feet was determined ignoring the testimonies ofW.L. Millsaps, his son 
William A. Millsaps, Richard Peplinski and Dennis Akers and relying on a survey 
that did not represent a road but a travel path in a road and had nothing to do with 
the appearance or location of the access road between 1966 and 1980. 
On second appeal this Court found Richard Peplinski's testimony was a credible 
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while referring to his testimony describing the access road crossing into section 24 
and continuing west into Akers' property for about 120 feet before curving in the 
shape of a Shepard's crook southerly into the 160 acres refuting Akers' claim that 
the road turned south into Reynolds property before entering section 24. 
D. Amount of Damages 
As to the amount of damages, we cite Cox v. Stolworthy, 94 Idaho 683, 496 
P.2d 682 (1972) modified by Cheney v. Palos Verdes Inv. Corp., 104 Idaho 897, 
904-905, 665 P.2d 661,668-669 (1983) and argue that no policy of deterrence is 
furthered by the amount of the award since Marti Mortensen will not face 
easement disputes in the future. 
Judge Mitchell's errors are the reason for this long-drawn-out litigation. 
Although Judge Mitchell states, 
The irony is that had Mortensens and Whites brought litigation to have their 
easement rights against Akers decided judicially, prior to their excavation 
and intimidation, this could have ended peaceably almost a decade ago. 
[Tf. 570 at 591 line 13] Defendants are not responsible for the Court's errors that 
required three appeals and corrections by the Supreme Court. 
3. Attorneys Fees 
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Marti Mortensen did not object to the amount of attorneys claimed, but 
rather to the underlying decision to award them. AKERS entitlement to attorneys 
fees flows from IRC 6-202 and applies only to those fees incurred to enforce the 
trespass provisions of that statute. The fees must apportioned pursuant to 
Bumgarner v. Bumgarner, 124 Idaho 629, 862 P.2d 321 (1993). 
4. Punitive Damages Allocable to MARTI MORTENSEN 
Respondents correctly assert that the issue is whether the conduct giving 
rise to damages benefitted the community. [Respondent's brief at 21] But the state 
of mind required to establish punitive damages, "malice" or "extreme 
wrongfulness" Manning v. Twin Falls Clinic & Hospital, Inc. 122 Idaho 47,830 
P.2d 1185 (1991), quoting Cheney v. Palos Verdes Inv. Corp., 104 Idaho 897, 905, 
665 P.2d 661, 669 (1983) should not be applied to an innocent spouse. 
Community liability for spousal torts is based on agency principles, and 
agency law does not necessarily impose punitive damages against a principal for 
an agent's acts absent authorization or ratification. Manning v. Twin Falls Clinic 
& Hospital, Inc. 122 Idaho 47, 830 P.2d 1185 (1991). Thus while a spouse may 
be engaged generally in an activity intended to benefit the community, as inHegg 
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v. lR.S., 28 P.3d 1004, 136 Idaho 61 (2001), where he steps aside from that 
activity to commit malicious acts, liability should not apply to a spouse absent 
authorization or ratification. 
AKERS argues that Marti Mortensen waived this issue by failing to raise it 
in prior appeals. 
A. This Issue was Within the Scope of Remand 
Issues that are "subsidiary to the actions directed by the appellate court" 
may be addressed on remand. Mountainview Landowners Co-op. Ass 'n, Inc. v. 
Cool, 142 Idaho 861, 136 P.3d 332 (2006); State v. Hosey, 134 Idaho 883, 886, 11 
P.3d 1101, 1104 (2000). Akers v. Mortensen, 147 Idaho 39, 205 P.3d 1175, 1183 
(2009) included the issue of joint and several liability in its remand. 
This issue was subsidiary for one simple reason: the Supreme Court 
recognized that the whole issue of punitive damages could not be decided until the 
exact limits of the easement were known. Therefore only after that decision was 
made could punitive damages even be addressed. Once addressed, the question of 
applicability to Marti Mortensen was appropriately before the court. 
B. New Events 
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Mortensens were not divorced when the underlying events occurred. That 
change of status is a critical event since Marti Mortensen had no reason to assert 
separate liability at the time this suit began. This Court should recognize an 
exception to permit a divorcing spouse to at lease revisit the issue when a case is 
remanded on appeal, since there is no prejudice to the other party. 
5. Change of Judge 
White Construction's brief at 45 discusses Caps tar Radio Operating Co. v. 
Lawrence, _ Idaho _, _ P.3d _ (Slip Op. No. 38300, Supreme Court of Idaho 
May 29, 2012). That case is strikingly similar to this one: same judge, same 
appeals counsel (James, Vernon and Weeks), easement issues and a motion to 
recuse. This court, just as it had in the original, withdrawn opinion in Akers v. 
Mortensen, 147 Idaho 39, 205 P.3d 1175 (2009), directed that a new judge hear 
the case. 
With all possible respect to Judge Mitchell and to this court, if a 10 year 
history of litigation and 'bad blood' justifies a change of judge in that case, it 
certainly does in this case. If nothing else, purely from an appearance of 
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impropriety standpoint, this Court should follow White's argument and require a 
change of judge. 
Conclusion 
This Court should follow the arguments by other appellants and remand this 
matter to correct the error is the location of the easement before a new Judge. 
Additionally this Court should find attorneys fees and punitive damages awarded 
were excessive and inapplicable to Marti Mortensen. 
October 24, 2012 
Dus s 
Attorney for MARTI MORTENSEN 
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